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IN THF: Sl!PREMF: C:OllRT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
;,Tl' 'JF l'Tl\H, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v- Case No. 19376 
·~~PY T. COLF:S, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDEN~ 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant, Gary T. Coles, appeals his conviction for 
1Jrivi11g 11nder the Influence of Alcohol, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann.~ 41-6-44 (1981). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried in absentia in a non-jury trial 
on ,\CJ:iust 24, 19R2 in the Second Circuit Court in and for Rich 
~0unty, State of Utah, and was found guilty of Driving Under 
• 'P Influence of Alcohol by the Honorable Ted S. Perry • 
. ~rfJP] L:int was sentenced on September 28, 1982 to serve 60 days 
in thP Rich County Jail and was fined $299. On appeal to the 
.-L· 1 uiicial District court in and for Rich County, State of 
.. ,, thP conviction was affirmed. 
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Influence of Alcohol (AT. 7-). Appellant pleaa "Not Gllt!t 
ann toln the court he had retained Ronaln Yengich a 1, 
The court informea appellant that trial wouln he helri the 
morning of August 24, 1982 and instructen appellant to , 0 
notify his attorney (AT. 2). 
Appellant notified his attorney, who then file" 0 
notice of appearance of counsel ann a demann for jury trid: 
(ST. 3-5; R. 6-7). Appellant's counsel assumen that tlw lr-
would then be removed from a bench calander and placen on, 
jury trial calander, changing the trial date. f!OW(".>er, 1 : 
such change was macle, and consequently neither appellant 
his counsel appeared at the August 24, 1982 trial (TT. JI. 
Because appellant had not given any reason for he: 
non-appearance, the court, in accordance with Utah Co:ie 1;n° .. 
<; 77-3S-17(a)!2) (1982), dischargen the jury ana tried 
appellant in absentia (TT. 3). The court found appellant 
guilty of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol awl issued 
bench warrant (TT. 191. 
Appellant was notified by a letter natecl August '4, 
1982 that he had been tried in absentia and found guiltv llT-
3; R. 11). On August 27, 19R2 appellant filen a Motioo to,,. 
Aside Judgment and Recall Rench Warrant, arguing that co 111 ''' 
after filing an Appearance of Counsel ann ,Jury Demanrl, hod 
been informed by the court that the jury trial had hPe 11 
scheduled for August 24, 1982 ( R. 12). The court denic,J 
motion, ruling that appellant at the July 27, lg82 a1rat·l""' 
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1 ·v1 had received personal notice of the elate and time set 
t1 ,,,1 and been advised that he should inform his counsel 
11,ilt dcitP (R. 13). 
Appellant appeared with counsel John O'Connell, law 
~irtr "'r of appellant's counsel Ronald Yengich, at the 
tpe."lher 28, 1982 sentencing hearing and renewed his motion 
tn set asicle the judgment (ST. 2-4). O'Connell admitted that 
3pu 0 l lant had told Yengich of the August 24, 1982 trial date, 
: ,• saul that Yengich hacl advised appellant that a new elate 
w~"lrl he' set because a Jury Demand had been filed (ST. 5). 
G' ~onnel 1 argued that appellant shoLJld not be deprived of his 
r10ht to defend himself merely because of counsel's mistakes 
and that a new trial should be ordered. The court again 
rlenie·l the motion, rLJling that even if appellant's absence was 
lustified, appellant still had not discharqed his burden of 
e0 tahlishing that he woLJld present a substantial defense (ST. 
'-~l. The coLJrt then sentenced appellant to serve 60 clays in 
tl.e Rich County Jail and pay a fine of $299 (ST. 8). 
On appeal, the First District CoLJrt of Rich County 
affitmed the trial coLJrt (R. 53-54). The District Court held 
tr.cit ilpf>cllant's motion to set aside the judgment for failure 
tr, rPceeive notice of the trial was properly denied inasmuch as 
tne• r~cronl established that appellant and counsel in fact did 
'..1 r. not ice of trial. The District Court further ruled that 
t hP other issLJes ra isecl by appellant, the right of a defendant 
tn he present and represented by counsel at trial, were 
-5-
"without JT\erit" because they were raised fnr t'11• first, 
ap[)eal. In any event, the District Court staterl, ar•f"I' 
hacl evrcry opportunity t 1 i he prPsent and he r0present"•l' 
counsel (R. 53-54). 
ARllGMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPFRLY TRIED APPELLN1T 
IN HIS ABSENCF. SINCF. HF. WAS V()LlJNTARILY 
ABSENT AFTER HAVING RECEIVED NOTICE Of THF. 
TIME FOR TRIAL. 
Ap[)ellant in his brief contencls that the trial 
committed error by trying hiJT\ in his absence. While, as 
appellant notes, a defenclant noes have an affirmativf' rtJ''. 
"to appear ancl defend in person and by coLJnsel," rit.,h ,-1c-
Ann.' '7-35-17(a) (lgR2), that right is not absolutP. 5t'· 
v. Glen'ly, L'tah, 6S6 P.2d 990 (lgR2l; State v. Myers. 2G 
2rl 2S4. snR P.2d 41 (1973). Utah Code Ann. ' 77-)S-1"!1 1 
provirles: 
In prosecutions for offenses not 
pllnishable by death, the defenclant's 
voluntarv absence froJT\ the trial after 
notice t~ defendant of the time for trial 
shal 1 not prevent the case froJT\ he ing 
tried and a verclict or judgment entererl 
therein shal 1 have the same effect as if 
defendant ~ad been present.2 
(fmphasis adcled). 
2 Subsections (1) and (31 of Utah Code Ann.' 77-3S-l-
describe other except ions not [)ert inent to the cac, 0 
bar. 
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l\ppellant was chargecl with Drivin') Under the 
.ri<'" "f Alcohol, a class Bmisclemeanor (R. 2). This 
.,.,,. is nnt punishahle hy death. lJtah Corle Ann. 
,_,,-441dl. Thus, if appellant hacl received notice of the 
1_1•1• s1·t fnr trial anrl harl voluntnrily ahsentPd himself fro"' 
•r• 11, then it was proper fnr the trial court to proceed with 
tr•>- ti 1 cil in appellant's absence in accorrlance with Utah Code 
'r•1. ~ "-,-35-17(a)(2). 
Appellant in his brief even admits that he hacl been 
11·1t1f1Prl as to the time for trial (Appellant's brief p.5). 
r11wPver, appellant contends that he shoulrl have been notified 
'econrl time by service on his retained counsel as to a new 
•rinl rlate. This contention is baserl on two assumptions: 
f1r~t, that the trial date would be reschecluled merely by 
·'!T•·llant's filing of a Jury neriand; ancl seconcl, that the 
trid] court was requirecl to serve written notice of the 
-·x;,,,ctr>cl new trial date on appellant's counsel in accordance 
·•1th 11+-nh Cocle Ann. ~ 77-35-3 ( 1982). 
Neither assuription has merit. The trial court in no 
w1s0 inclicatecl to appellant or appellant's counsel that the 
'iling of a Jury Dernancl woulcl result in the reschecluling of 
'hu trial, nor is this result required by statute. 
•· '•·1 Lent's argument that such is the practice in other 
•r i cts (ST. 3, 5) does not excuse appellant's absence fro'll 
1 tal. rn the absence of notice to the contrary, appellant 
-, •ul-1 have assurnecl that the trial would proceed on the date 
-7-
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11 ,,,,, t ri ell is voluntary only if clone in an attempt to gain an 
,,l· "'''-,I"· Although the rule espoused in Myers, permitting a 
', 1 1 ,1f tlvc right to he present at trial by a clefendant's 
1 1 1 ,,,,t ,1 '/ al.sc·nce, is clesigned to prevent the manipulation of 
_c11t t" t,., a cunning defendant, the opinion in Myers cannot be 
fairly rPacl to require a finding that the defendant's absence 
"'s ci1sd, 1civously motivated before it can be iletermined that 
Significantly, this court in 
State v. rlenny, supra, recently rulecl that the defendant's 
al'' nee: ":as voluntary even though "no evidence suggests that 
;.,f~nclant' s ahsence was used as a means of obtaining a 
f0nrahlc acl·;antage for either side." Id. at 992. 
Appellant in his hrief also claims that his absence 
was nit voluntary because he was simply following the advice 
Appellant cloes not claim that counsel preventecl 
:.1s ar1pearance or otherwise coerced him. Counsel merely told 
3rnc·l lant incorrectly that the trial elate would be changed. 
lipp 0 l lant voluntarily acted on that information. In any 
c""nt, appellant's acting on counsel's advice shoulcl be deemecl 
., '~Jntary. An entry of a plea of guilty on the advice of 
c 11uns1:l is presurnecl voluntary ancl intelligent. Guglielmetti 
~mer, 27 Utah 2cl 341, 496 P.2d 2fil (1972); State v. 
~J_ 0 , "tah, 1)41 P.~d ll'l (1982); Moxley v. Morris, Utah, 655 
0 .'1 r,4n ( 1CJR2). By analogy, therefore, the absence of a 
l1 i 1 1td.111t who has relied on counsel's statements should also 
''" f'rr'sumecl voluntary. 
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Finally, appellant was not prejuc1icec1 by heinq t· 
in absentia because the evidence of his guilt was 
overwhelming: Patrolman Slagavskie test if iecl that he oh''''..-
appellant driving his vehicle at an excessive speed ITT. 1_, 
appell<:JnL admitted driving the vehicle (TT. 14-15); ap[l€l;e 
failed three field sobriety tests (TT. 7-9); appellant ha' 
blood alcohol level of .13 (ST. 6; R. 30); and appellant 
admitted that he had been out drinking with friencls anrl thi~ 
they mixed the drinks "pretty stong" (TT. 14-15). Because,, 
the strength of the state's case, there is no sufficier.t 
likelihood that the result would have been clifferent harl 
appellant been present at trial. Therefore, the conviction 
shoulcl not be disturbecl. State v. Eaton, Tltah, 56q P.2'1 11'~ 
1116 (1977); Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 2SO, 254 
( 1969). 
POINT II 
APPELLANT WAS NOT DENIED THE RIGHT TO 
COUNSEL. 
A. APPELLANT CANNOT RAISE THIS ISSUE FOR 
THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL. 
It is well settled in Utah that a party cannot rai' 
an issue for the first time on appeal absent exceptional 
circumstances. Wagner v. Olsen, 25 Utah 2d 366, 482 P.!rl 
(1971); state v. stegqell, Utah, 6fi0 P.2d 252 (19R3). 
At the sentencing hearing appellant complainci 
that the trial court erred in proceeding in absentia hec·e'J'' 
-10-
,,,,msl'l harl not been served with notice (ST. 2-7). Appellant 
'11mcd he had been denied the right to counsel for the first 
• irne on appeal to the First District Court of Rich County, 
1·1h11:h rulerl that the denial of the right to counsel issue was 
"without merit" because it harl not heen raised at trial (R. 
S3-S4). 
Because appellant has advanced no exceptional 
circumstances warranting an exception to this rule, appellant 
chnuld not he allowed to raise this issue on appeal. 
B. APPELLANT'S TRIAL IN ABSENTIA 
RESULTING FROM THEVOLUNTARY ABSENCE 
OF APPELLANT AND HIS COUNSEL WAS NOT 
A DENIAL OF APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO 
COUNSEL. 
Assuming arguendo that this issue is properly before 
the Court, appellant was not denied the right to counsel when 
the trial was held in his absence. 
Appellant's July 13, 1982 arraignment hearing had 
~en continued so that appellant coulrl retain counsel (AT. 2). 
Appellant informed the trial court at his arraingment that he 
had retained Mr. Ronald Yengich as counsel (AT. 2). Mr. 
Y0n•1ich subsequently filed an Appearance of Counsel (R. 6). 
Although appellant claims that he failed to appear 
at trial in reliance on counsel's mistaken assumption that the 
tr1Al time would be changed, appellant does not contend that 
cc,unsel was ineffective, and, in fact, appellant cannot so 
claim because he continues to employ the same counsel. 
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Appellant hacl every opportunity to he present,. 
be represented by counsel at trial. Significantly, app,c1 .· 
cites no cases supporting the proposition that a rliofendu"' 
be denied the right to counsel by the voluntary absence r 
defendant and his counsel. On the other hand, this Court 
other cases involving a defendant's voluntary absence fro-
trial has helcl that " a defendant cannot hy his voluntary 
invalidate the proceedings." State v. Aikers, 87 Utah SO', 
P.2d 1052 (1935); State v. Ross, TJtah, 655 P.2d fi41 (19821. 
Therefore, appellant was not denied his ri~ht t: 
counsel, and the judgment appealed from shoulcl be affirme~. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court properly proceecled with the trial:· 
absentia because appellant had received notice of the •i~e 00 • 
for trial and was voluntarily absent. 
Appellant cannot raise the issue of denial cf uc'" 
to counsel for the first time on appeal. In any event, 
appellant retained counsel and had every opportunity to he 
represented by him at trial. 
19 83. 
Therefore, the judgment he low should be affirmEd. 
RESPECTPULLY submitted this U,cl__ day of Nove'llher, 
DAVID L. 
I 
. S'!'EPHF::N MIKITA 
AV1stant Attorney General 
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